China and India are related to some structural features of the two economies.
China and India have had a remarkable period of economic growth over the last quarter century, and as a result there has been a significant decline in mass poverty in these two large poor countries, more dramatically so in China. But this impressive economic growth and decline of income poverty have not been adequately reflected in some general features in the lives of the poor, particularly in the crucial matter of health. There are some egregious 'failures' of both market and government in the sphere of health services in all countries, but they have been particularly acute in China and India. We shall discuss this problem in the larger context of the political and economic structure in the two countries, and show that the structural deficiencies from which the problem arises are similar as well as different in the two cases.
In some broad aggregative measures of health outcome the Chinese performance has been much better than India's, and it has been so for several decades. For example, life expectation at birth now in India is what it used to be in China in the early 70's; in infant mortality by 1975
China achieved a rate which India did not reach even in 2000. To this we may add that of India's under-three children as many as 46 per cent are underweight, compared to China's 8 per cent. Under-five child mortality rate in India is more than twice that of China. There are, of course, some differences in initial conditions between the two countries. India being in general nearer the tropics than most of China, one expects a larger incidence of certain diseases in India, and conditions of vector control may be more difficult, other things remaining the same. According to WHO estimates for 1998, the burden of infectious and parasitic diseases (measured in terms of DALY's-disability-adjusted life years-per capita) is 7 times as high in India compared to China.
This may be partly the result of differences in physical and climatic conditions. But only partly, as this is also partly an outcome of relative policy deficiency.
Socialist China had a much more vigorous policy of public health and sanitation than India, and also a larger army of paramedics pressed into basic public health service in the villages. By the middle 70's China had a rudimentary system of medical insurance (called "cooperative health services") that covered the overwhelming majority of rural people, something that did not exist in India.
Also, the Chinese government showed an ability to mobilize campaigns for preventive health care and against public health threats that were impressive by most developing country standards.
In contrast India after Independence never had any system of public health and sanitation anywhere on that scale.
There has been no systematic planning and delivery of public health services (as opposed to curative medical services) or sustained large-scale disease control. As Dasgupta (2005) points out, in India "there is strong capacity for dealing with (disease) outbreaks when they occur, but not to prevent them from occurring. Impressive capacity also exists for conducting intensive campaigns, but not for sustaining these gains on a continuing basis after the campaign. This is illustrated by the near- Only about 15% of the people in India have any health insurance (primarily through their employers), and the share of out of pocket spending in total health spending exceeds 70%, which is higher than in China (though it has increased faster in the latter country). Appearances to the contrary, health care in India is predominantly private (which is largely unregulated). Household survey data suggest that 85% of all visits for health care in rural areas, even by the poorest people, are to private practitioners. While the poor quality of service in public clinics and hospitals (and absenteeism by nurses and doctors) often drive patients to private doctors (some of them quacks or crooks) in India, in China the high fees charged in public health clinics (and the latters' concentration on revenue-generating activities) in effect turn them into for-profit private providers. As Yip and Mahal(2008) point out, in India unlike China at least the public facilities receive the bulk of their revenues from government subsidies and they provide their (often paltry and poor-quality) services at low cost to those who are too poor to afford the more expensive private care (although rampant corruption renders the public service provided not entirely free).
In both countries doctors often over-medicate and refer patients to unnecessary diagnostic tests, driving up health costs in general. This is part of a general market failure in health care, where the decider (the doctor) is not the purchaser (the patient). In poor countries with little information and education the problem is exacerbated as the patients themselves sometimes show preference for unnecessary antibiotics and steroids, which the quacks oblige them with. In both countries the more important problem is a governance failure. The public health delivery system is afflicted by poor provider incentives, coupled with low accountability to the patients.[For an elaboration of these issues in the context of India, see Hammer, Aiyar, and Samji (2007) ].
First of all, the medical personnel are paid a fixed salary independent of the number of patients or of their visits, so they have no economic incentive to serve them.
In China, some of their non-fixed salary is in terms of commissions on drug sales, with effects on overprescription. Secondly, there is little monitoring or punishment for laxity in service. Thirdly, the poor have very little organized 'voice' in sanctioning the errant provider. In the otherwise vibrant democracy of India, in most areas the state of local democracy is not strong enough to keep public service providers accountable to the local citizens. Periodic elections provide a rather blunt instrument for keeping public officials in check, and in any case the electoral agenda are full of multiplicity of pressing issues of which poor health service is only one among many. Besides, politicians find it easier to claim credit for inaugurating a big hospital or installing new equipment there than for regular maintenance of services or public sanitation and vector control. In China the channels of local accountability are even weaker. In both countries local social groups and NGO's provide some accountability pressure in localized pockets.
In both countries there is now a renewed effort on the part of the government to press more resources into and improve the delivery of public health services. The Chinese program seems more ambitious, in attempting to provide a partially subsidized universal basic health care, and they have more budgetary resources to devote to this. But in both countries the governance and accountability issues mentioned earlier will not be resolved easily. In India the weakness of local democracy coupled with a corrupt and inert bureaucracy dissipate many a well-intentioned policy measure from above. In 
